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Regarding the Most Recent Work 
of Monsieur Flourens 
and 
the Origin of Modern Ideas About Life 
Maurice Raynaud, M.D. 
A book by Pierre Flourens is always an event because universal 
acclaim always follows its appearance. This is only fitting. For even 
though the author's academic rank is high, it is his consummate ability 
that really accounts for this on-going success. Much like Fontenelle, 
Buffon and Cuvier, M. Flourens is a versatile thinker who functions 
within the great tradition of the Academy of Sciences. 1-3 
In this light I shall recall that grand event when a belated testi-
monial was held to honor the memory of our illustrious colleague, 
Magendie. 4 As always happens, a large gathering had formed beneath 
the Mazarin cupola. But on this particular occasion, the audience 
stirred more restlessly than usual because they knew the spokesman 
for the Academy was M. Flourens. May I continue along this path for 
a moment? That day, M. Flourens fortuitously proclaimed a great 
truth. He said, "You were all made to live for at least 120 years. If 
you do not reach this age, you have only yourselves to blame." 5 In 
making this statement, M. Flourens echoed the sentiments of another 
writer who once wished that "if (I) could grasp but one unambiguous 
truth, (I) would immediately announce it to all mankind!" Yes, phil-
osophers always curse intemperance and, yes, we always let philos-
ophers have their say. M. Flourens added that, paradoxically, almost 
every indulgent Frenchman wanted to read his book. Well, the size of 
this group alone would have insured a fortune for this publisher! 
The truly great scope of this new book, On Life and Intelligence, 
demands a corresponding maturity in those who would consider it.6 
Here, M. Flourens grapples with some of the most difficult problems 
that link physiology with metaphysics, with those that surround the 
broad aspects of life itself as well as the root manifestations of the 
human intellect. Not only does he analyze the bonds that unite these 
realities, but he also surveys the boundaries which separate them. 
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(Later on, we shall consider how his success springs from employing 
the experimental method, even though he virtually excludes data 
- especially his own. Instead, he attempts to criticize. I suggest that 
we try to recall this while we study the book, since it will be beneficial 
if he proves to be accurate. ) Old facts and new insights - these would 
seem to indicate a book of doctrine. Well, the book is indeed concise 
and tightly written. In fact, its brevity can even be misleading. Finally, 
let me say that the book contains the author's definitive conclusions. 
Am I compelled to follow this same outline? I think not. Certainly 
not out of loyalty. M. Flourens neither demands nor needs this kind 
of devotion. His own approach involves tracing the opinions of his 
predecessors (which, often enough, he rejects), drawing on his own 
rich background and juxtaposing their formulations with his, as if to 
say to the impartial public, "Here are their interpretations and here 
are mine. Compare them and judge for yourselves." Again, it would 
be mistaken to see in this book merely a critique of the old physiol-
ogy. Certainly the author's great capacity for admiration should also 
be emphasized. He is sympathetic toward all sincere and erudite work 
even though he remains convinced that a valid exposition, even if 
simple, sufficiently refutes errol'. We shall see that M. Flourens is, by 
nature, little inclined to discuss. He is concerned more with verdicts 
than with motives. Therefore, he would rather just decide. 
The historical aspects of this book mesh easily with those of the 
author's Academic Eulogies. 7 True, the science of life implicitly includes 
everything but a book filled with names like Jussieu, Cando lIe, Cuvier 
and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire is closely akin to those which recall names 
such as Haller and Bichat. 8- 12 But doesn't natural history include 
physiology explicitly? Of course it does. Therefore, considerations of 
life itself stand only a step away, ready to emerge from within this 
same history through the logic of facts and ideas. Unfortunately there 
is the great temptation to assist the author as he attempts all of this. 
Believe that if I succumb, I do so only out of concern for exposing the 
truth and not out of any desire for originality. 
May I say a few words about the general format of M. Flourens's 
writing? First, it does not elicit a tentative judgment. If it does not 
quickly please, it never pleases. This is largely a function of an inflex-
ible literary style which features an eloquence born from precision and 
accuracy. Precision he establishes initially and then eloquence follows. 
But I would hasten to exclude from this judgment the Eulogies, since 
his subjects there are so broad and his touch so subtle and delicate. 
Well, this is altogether permissible. The literary character of these 
works allows M. Flourens to show a master's judicious resourcefulness, 
disciplined verve and sober yet piquant grace. In all honesty, I wish 
that his graceful presence at the French Academy was more widely 
appreciated. Only the mediocre would be resentful. 
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Second, his style is never flimsy. He never languishes. On the con-
trary, he is halting, precipitous and even abrupt. True, he exaggerates a 
disregard for development and transition, those indispensable elements 
of artful writing. (Indeed, M. Flourens has come to the point where he 
constructs paragraphs from two lines and chapters from two pages. 
Possibly this is an attempt to separate himself from undistinguished 
authors.) All the same, those of his lines which tie " this" to "that" are 
evident to those who have grasped his trend of thought but are ever 
obscure to those who have failed to do so. I suspect that he intends all 
of this in order to capture an aphorismic purity. By employing this 
kind of style, he caters to the reader who shares with the man of 
letters the pleasure of reconstructing a disheveled phrase . Unfor-
tunately, though, he must trust the astuteness of the masses in so 
doing, and this can be dangerous. The masses do not like to guess. 
After experiencing the pleasure of understanding, they desire the addi-
tional pleasure of understanding why they understood. 
I 
We are ever mindful of those creatures upon whom nature calls to 
play the dominant role in the universe. They exercise an influence 
upon their physical surroundings that is far superior to that which 
they, in turn , receive. They do actually dominate but retain , in so 
doing, an enduring character and a distinctive individuality despite all 
temporary modifications of form and circumstance. But the 
immensely important observation is this : they are born, they multiply, 
and after perpetuating the species, they die. 
At first glance, the mystery of human life seems to have com-
manded the attention of observers from every age. Assuredly, a vague 
sentiment of this type does indeed seem to have occupied the human 
spirit from time immemorial, dictating the necessity of exploring life 
itself - its boundaries, its conditions, and its functioning. But 
curiously enough, the ancients never excelled in this undertaking. 
Their poets virtually overflow with profound feelings about beauty 
and about nature's inexhaustible fecundity and power. Yet despite all 
of this, these movements of the spirit unfortunately became petrified 
at the level of aspiration. Philosophy remained attached to poetic 
ideas. 
Now I want neither to retrace the well-known origins of the ancient 
philosophers nor to survey that first long glance they cast upon 
nature. Scientifically sterile though it was - owing to its unconcern 
for limits - this vision was, all the same, as immense as the panorama 
it beheld. No, nor do I wish to indulge in the pleasure of researching 
the first outlines of physiology within the high speculations of 
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Parmenides and Empedocles. Nonetheless, I must emphasize that this 
ill-defined Pantheism managed to confuse the two elements com-
prising the universe - animate and inanimate matter. For within this 
same vision, within this infant precursor of scientific thought, identi-
cal names and laws were indiscriminately applied to both classes of 
matter. 
This particular confusion disappeared subsequently, but only as a 
preliminary to the rise of a more subtle and more dangerous confu-
sion: accepting knowledge of man as the starting point for all 
knowledge. As analytical philosophy entered the stream of positive 
discoveries, the existence of the soul - its spirituality, attributes and 
immortal destiny - all of this appeared, riding this crest of luminous 
evidence. What also emerged was an abundance of proofs, and to their 
cogency the ensuing centuries have added nothing. 
I think that it all had to take place precisely in this way. I believe 
that a demonstrable yet free and intelligent principle answered a 
primordial need for a basis of morality. All the rest remained a matter 
of curiosity -legitimate curiosity, to be sure, but a matter devoid of 
urgency and a function of time and experience. 
Confusion, of course, abounded. The study of man's morality 
obscured all other studies by subsuming their respective provinces into 
its own realm. Thus, the notion of life became confused with the 
notion of soul, a misconception we still see reflected in all ancient 
languages. Consequently, we have inherited all those most synony-
mous words, I/Juxr). fjUIlOS. 1I0U~ animus, anima, mens, spiritus and 
many others, whose precise meanings still baffle the patience and 
sagacity of the philologists.1 3 And this same characteristic vague-
ness was to remain an on-going burden, especially after attempts 
at precise translation often ended by endowing almost synonymous 
terms with almost contradictory meanings. Added to this hodgepodge 
was the unfortunate vocabulary established through substituting 
names of organs (which had supposedly been identified as the 
seat of the unknown principle) for the name of the principle itself. 
This occurred not only in the vernacular but also in the formal opera-
tions of the philosophers. Thus, lung, brain, heart, liver and dia-
phragm, each in turn, usurped this ever available role with an ensuing 
chaos that you can well imagine. 
Confused notions of "soul" and "life" are clearly reflected in the 
work of a most famous ancient, Plato. Who could ever forget the 
incomparable passage when Socrates, facing death, discusses with his 
friends, individually, his own prospects for immortality?14 At that 
moment, he attempted to prove that his soul was not a collectivity nor 
a result, nor was it a report or a non-entity, comparable to the 
harmony flowing from the music of a lyre. No, he told them that it 
was instead a genuine principle, an indivisible entity - irrefutably 
spiritual and immortal. 
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But even here is there not a measure of ambiguity in the words and 
spirit of the first ancient philosopher?15 Yes there is. So we willingly 
concede that prior to the era of Hippocrates, and even during his own 
lifetime, the study of life had never really been attempted by either 
philosophers or physicians. The honor of primacy belongs to him 
alone. Still we must recognize, in our attempt to analyze the ensuing 
revolution, that Hippocrates functioned essentially as a physician and 
never really aspired to any other role, but no matter, for this approach 
was to be his chief asset. And yet, despite this great advantage, his 
physiology was related to the medical practice of the day in the same 
way that philosophy later on would be related to theology: it was 
merely a servant and a rather neglected one at that. 
On the other hand, this illustrious healer was able to visualize many 
enigmatic dimensions of human existence as being integrated, such as the 
capacity to resist morbid influences and the instinct to fight disease. 
He bestowed upon these realities the descriptive terms 1/1 vx rf. q,V(1L5. 
and IlJoPPwlJ .16 And yet we could pose fundamental questions even to 
him: What are you? What constitutes your essential being? Where do 
you really reside? By what primitive acts do you make yourself truly 
manifest? We would find that he lacked both the answers and the 
desire to search for them. This, then, is the real significance of those 
autocratic theories of naturalism, coction, and crisis; they are merely 
theories which were oriented to practicing medicine; oriented to the 
art of curing, but oriented to nothing more. 
"There are," he tells us, "certain Sophists - doctors among them -
who hold that one must know (in order to fully understand medicine) 
what man in essence really is, how he was first created and what his 
most fundamental being really consists of. Well, as far as I am con-
cerned, the writings of Sophists are more useful to publishers than to 
doctors. Only by observation from the medical viewpoint can we 
obtain a certain grasp of man's constitution." 17 Therefore , one can 
easily misunderstand the spirit and tendencies of Hippocratic dog-
matism by looking for a corpus of physiological doctrine. The 
elements . necessary for compiling such a work - anatomy, most 
basically - were not yet available. 
I had not planned on returning to antiquity to examine the vicissi-
tudes in the science of man, but here we are. Yes, Hippocrates reigned 
as master and master he would remain, despite the schools of medicine 
that were to follow. His successors were abJe to add very little to his 
teachings other than various approaches to approving or disproving 
them. And for a long time afterward, only one man - Aristotle -
would critically penetrate within that profound mystery which is our 
very nature. Now Aristotle was much too judicious to overlook that 
fundamental distinction between "life" and "soul." Without attempt-
ing to force analogies too much, we can say that his famous delin-
eation of the three souls is comparable to Bichat's theory of two lives. 
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It represented the first attempt of this kind, and it was most 
ingenious. The marvel is that this great distinction emerged from the 
thought of a naturalist. We should also note that physiology and the 
rudiments of comparative anatomy were also being born during this 
same era. 
But let us not overlook that great failure of Aristotle's philosophy 
- his persistence in substituting logical concepts for natural realities. 
His entelechies really hold to nothing tangible. To the substance of life 
~Al] they were what form is to matter - a relationship. Or, if you 
prefer, a reason for being. In any case, they were pure abstractions. 
Aristotle asks himself, "Is entelechy inseparable from the living 
body?" And without daring to answer in the affirmative, he questions 
further, "Does it participate in the same type of relationship as that 
which exists between pilot and ship?" He then commands himself to 
consider the problem no further, but no. He is finally led to his fam-
ous definition of t.he soul: "The soul, having the power of life, is the 
first entelechy of the natural and organized body." We must confess 
that this is a bit nebulous. 1B 
Despite considerable chronological distance, the transition between 
Aristotle and Galen is simple to make, because never have two 
geniuses been so similar in approach and erudition. 19 A peripatetic in 
both style and method, Galen goes so far as to copy his model even in 
mistakes, useless distinctions, fastidious repetitions and subtle dialec-
tics. But all is redeemed by his infinitely more practical orientation. 
His "physiology" - if you will pardon my advancing that term - was 
redirected from logic toward fact as he continually sought out con-
firmation through recourse to anatomy. (Actually, many rather com-
plicated movements had prepared the way for this development.) At 
the same time, he was able to preserve the nomenclature of his 
predecessors as well as to lend emphasis to certain specific passages in 
their writings. In addition, the dissection of criminals' cadavers was 
being permitted at the Alexandrian school (for the first time) under 
the encouragement of the Ptolemys themselves. (Needless to say, it 
was this locale that Galen frequented .) Then too, he devoted a propor-
tionately large section of his encyclopedic compendium to revisions of 
Hippocratic formulations under the new name of pneumatism. And 
finally, Galen's theory of the faculties appeared and became antiq-
uity's definitive word on the principles of "life" and "intellect." 
Through a marvelous show of ability , he divided these "faculties" into 
three categories: first, blood vapors, which arose from the liver, 
comprised the natural faculties; second, after having transversed the 
heart and after having combined with a subtle quantity of the air 
(which breathing had delivered), the natural faculties became vital 
faculties; ultimately, the vital faculties, after having been expedited 
through the arteries to the brain, became modified into animal spirits 
May, 1981 155 
which were then capable of presiding over the higher function of intel-
lectual activity . 
It is impossible to remain indifferent to this striking system or to 
gloss over the concrete character of the soul which the ancients per-
ceived. We must also admire their grasp of the tenuous distinction 
between matter and spirit, not to mention their facility for dealing 
with these two categories of life, even though they had to fabricate 
nebulous transitions. Also, we can discern within this same vision the 
prominent position occupied by the gratuitous hypothesis. Yes, in 
light of these circumstances, we can appreciate just how much a man 
of his time Galen actually was, since he, like so many others, accepted 
word answers instead of sorely needed reasons. Galen believed that 
he could explain everything in terms of animal spirits as though he had 
actually seen them. He then forwarded a fundamental principle that 
accounted for every function. If questioned about nutrition, for 
example, he would answer that nutrition was a neutral ability existing 
in parallel with four qualities: the attractive one, which attracts 
nutrients; the retaining one, which confines them during coction; the 
assimilating one, which transforms nutriments into particles analogous 
to the substance of our bodies; and, finally, the expuising one, which 
eliminates the residues. This is what one had to be satisfied with. 
We must therefore concede that this need and this facility for 
explaining virtually everything away favored a distaste for method-
ology and a detrimental laziness of spirit. These same tendencies were 
responsible for much of the inertia which allowed the doctor from 
Pergamon to absolutely dominate the Middle Ages. Translated by 
Arabs, retranslated from translations and modified by legions of com-
mentators, Galen shared with Aristotle the privilege of reigning 
almost unchallenged throughout 14 centuries. 
We now come to the Middle Ages. This is such an unwieldy subject 
that we should dispense at once with trying to discover that which we 
shall not find there - a spirit and a taste for the physical sciences. Not 
only had theology and jurisprudence become the great concern of all 
philosophers and authors (and who could reproach them?) but they 
also imposed on the sciences of observation inappropriate directions, 
methodologies and conclusions. Instead of looking for facts in nature, 
one looked for explanations in books, for physiology in syllogisms and 
for physics in the Holy Writ. Then, as authority took precedence over 
experience, it became less a question of finding facts and more one of 
explaining books. And even when a fact was established, it became less 
a question of relating it to natural truth and more a matter of recon-
ciling it with Galen, Rhazes and Avicenna. 20- 21 This era was the 
heyday of occult qualities, of substances with forms, and of big words. 
All ultimately added to the legacy of Galen an imposing monument to 
ingenious erudition and intellectual contrivance. This era proved, if 
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nothing else, that even when the methods of explanation disappear, 
the need for adequate explanation has deep, imperishable roots. We 
should be good sports, though, and not deprecate the efforts of the 
medieval mind. We may even want to concede that they kept alive, in 
a defective sort of way, a scientific curiosity and a critical spirit which 
ultimately permitted science to emerge. Furthermore, as I have been 
speaking in generalities, I want to render homage to Roger Bacon and 
to his discoveries. I know of them only by reputation but I do not 
wish to disparage them in any way. 
By this time a unique doctrine had grown up in the shadow of the 
University, which partially disavowed it, and alongside the Church, 
which always condemned it. But this particular philosophy, which was 
so well suited to the friendly souls of mysticism (and their predeces-
sors), ultimately rendered services to science which would otherwise 
have been attained only with great difficulty. I am referring, of course, 
to alchemy, that bizarre phenomenon which has been so ably surveyed 
by M. Figuier.22 My tampering with his recent achievement would be 
impertinent indeed. Still, I do at least want to mention those aspects 
of alchemy that are germane to the present discussion. This striking 
doctrine, so universally propagated toward the end of the 15th cen-
tury, takes us back to antiquity once again. For h ere we again encoun-
ter the view that life subsists, to some degree, in all material things; 
that stones and minerals feed and multiply in the breast of Mother 
Earth in a way that simulates those elemental movements that take 
place within the depths of our own beings; that gold, being the 
"perfect metal," represents mineral life in all its perfection. Conse-
quently, drinking gold must represent the universal panacea, the key 
to eternal health and the ultimate goal of scientific research. Do not 
try to trace just how this quasi-doctrine of vital unity arose from 
hypotheses which were rooted in that confused amalgam of palmistry, 
sorcery and astrology. The task is quite futile. For the era which 
spawned the rise of this hermetic philosophy was the 16th century, 
one of those confusing epochs where one can find almost anything 
one wants in science and in every other place, too. The cauldron holds 
a little gold to be sure, but this is not the point. The relevant lesson is 
that a spirited ingenuity blossomed from a lattice of shaky supposi-
tions. Let us not linger here for too long. Hypotheses are important in 
the history of science only when they serve as the soul of a particular 
school or when they serve as the starting point for bigger and better 
undertakings. Now the sciences of observation, more than the others, 
are functions of tradition and method - two elements which were 
absent during the 16th century. Therefore, we shall pass over the fan-
tasies of that shameless charlatan and drunkard, Paracelsus. This man 
would inaugurate his lectures by burning the works of Galen while 
declaring that his own shoes knew more medicine than did the greatest 
doctors of antiquity! Also, we shall pass over Van Helmont, whose 
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intellect was infinitely more serious, profound and inquisitive. 23 His 
personality, however, was effusive and mysticism-<Jriented. In addi-
tion, he arrived 50 years too soon. His archaei in no way resembled 
the medicine of nature of Hippocrates or the spirits of Galen, or any 
approach belonging to either his predecessors or successors.24 No, he 
was concerned instead with imaginary beings and bizarre personifica-
tions of the occult, those fruits of an infantile epoch when most 
superior systems were still growing toward maturity. Furthermore, 
Van Helmont's real contribution lay in the field of chemistry where he 
became during the Renaissance, what Raymond Lulie became during 
the Middle Ages. 25 And, in fact, it is in chemistry that his name is 
linked to some of the fundamental movements of that infant science. 
II 
The advent of modern philosophy also coincided with a new 
beginning in physiology, although this was not the present era. Yet 
even there we find these same two sciences becoming inseparable. In 
marking its points of departure and arrival, this new philosophy set 
out to consider the great question of method. God knows, this same 
question has been greatly mishandled in recent times, and I am sorely 
tempted to return to the tendencies of Bacon and Descartes and draw 
parallels. 26, 27 But we must recognize that Bacon never directly gave 
birth to a genuine school of thought. Harvey, who was his friend, 
mocked him for this very reason. Furthermore, it has been demon-
strated that Bacon appreciated method as a goal, not as a means. This 
orientation did not destroy the academic value of methodology but it 
did change its objective. He redid Scholasticism in terms of sensuality 
and empiricism in a way that hindered real insight into the nature of 
life itself since these were rather peripheral considerations. No, this 
was an orientation that could only have led to statistics of a higher 
order. Bacon's philosophy has been wittily described as a system 
whereby the Chancellor of England went to his window to watch him-
self pass by .28 On the other hand , Bacon was able to expound (in 
rather admirable language) upon the new tendencies of the modern 
intellect - tendencies which, generally speaking, proceeded better 
than he did. In fact, they proceeded without him altogether. 
As for Descartes, he has been juxtaposed with Bacon too often. 
Worse, he has been juxtaposed in a manner that suggests a comparison 
between truth and error. 29 Descartes scarcely knew Bacon. However, 
when he did speak of Bacon - and this was only once or twice - it 
was with highest esteem. Each was a genius in his own right. But their 
eras, mentalities and societies were so dissimilar that a comparison is 
not warranted. Still, they were, together, able to inaugurate no less 
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than modern man's mode of perceiving which is based on observation. 
Descarte's genuine superiority springs from the authentic foundation 
upon which his philosophy rests. In heading straight for the principle 
of all knowledge, which is the study of the soul, he gave spirituality a 
scientific endorsement. But his success went further than this. He bril-
liantly demonstrated that matter is, in essence, infinitely less well 
understood than had been thought. If anything could have discour-
aged science, it was this kind of mystery! Every day, while we manip-
ulate matter, we inquire into its nature. Indeed, we are partially com-
posed of it. Yet nothing is more essentially obscure. In order to grasp 
its real character, we must view its expansiveness, the only property 
which Descartes would accept.30 Could matter be a conglomerate of 
infinitely small particles and imperceptible molecules? Can its dimen-
sions be subdivided until we reach a mere mathematical point, itself 
the very negation of expansiveness? Or, from the viewpoint of the real 
scheme of things, can we conceive of a veritable expanse composed of 
parts which have themselves no expansiveness? Expanse without 
expansiveness - what unintelligible chaos! 
By contrast, if I regard myself as a thinking substance, satisfaction 
comes from this same free and direct grasp of the inquiry's objective. 
This satisfaction is also enhanced by knowledge of man which, neces-
sarily, becomes elevated so as to include knowledge of God. But 
Descartes, genius that he was, fell into error by exclusively contem-
plating only one side of human nature. He then concluded that the 
inert expanse in matter lay beyond comprehension. Consequently, 
these errors have been attributed to his physiology and always will be. 
For him, the reasonable and intelligent soul absorbed everything else. 
The body became no more than a perfect machine with God directly 
regulating its movements while the unreasoning animal became 
nothing but a perfectly constructed clock. Some might therefore point 
to his "animal spirits" as proof of his having had vitalist tendencies. 
But I beg to remark that these "spirits" (a term he borrowed from 
Galen) change roles here and in no way resemble what today are called 
"vital properties." No, I am here concerned only with those qualities 
which he attached to material objects. In fact, their role is strictly 
mechanical. Emanating from the pineal gland, they come and they go; 
they move and are moved; they push and are pushed, moving all the 
while at inconstant velocities. But here there is never any question of 
an active force or an intimate principle of renewal and conservation. 
Interestingly enough, Bossuet includes a section on physiology in 
his Treatise on Knowing God and Oneself, although it is nothing but 
an eloquent commentary on the doctrine of Descartes.31 He zealously 
cries, "What an architect is He who erects a decrepit building but 
implants a principle that stands up tall within it, even among the 
ruins!" For Bossuet, the body was always a machine but the authentic 
father of this mechanism was Descartes. 
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Then too, Harvey had just recently illuminated the operation of the 
circulation, an advance which brought with it a parallel increase in 
attempts to employ physics in physiology. For half a century, seduc-
tive treatises relating to the actions of levers, fulcrums, resistors, 
hydraulic apparati and friction-induced heat abounded. In fact, the 
masterwork of Borelli succeeded precisely because theories of this sort 
were brought together in an economy that was accessible to calcula-
tion. 32 But once they were brought to bear on the intricate phen-
omena of nutrition, secretion and nervous action, these theories 
quickly became absurdly inadequate. For then it became necessary to 
postulate collisions between molecules resulting in round or cuboidal 
or pyramidal forms - whatever the theory demanded. Glands became 
either sieves or filters, while the "vital spirits," now overheated by 
continuous motion, required periodic restoration through respiration. 
Finally, a variety of spirits became necessary - hot spirits, cold spirits , 
bitter spirits, malignant spirits, clumsy spirits and subtle spirits. This 
pseudo-rigor reopened the door for gratuitous hypotheses and they 
did abound. 
Oh, how we are tempted to misappropriate limited knowledge! 
Here we can glimpse three temptations to which we seem to be peren-
nially vulnerable: first, misappropriating limited knowledge; second, 
judging theories more by the effort we expend in pursuing them and 
less by the light of the truth involved; and third, abandoning observa-
tion whenever it gives us results which are contrary to those we had 
expected. Consequently, when the newly acquired data of the chemist 
was added to this mechanical framework, we behold that the human 
body became a distillery roughly analogous to an experimentallabora-
tory. Unfortunately, we are today returning to this very vision of 
Descartes's, the vision which Sylvius reintroduced into science under 
the guise of iatrochemistry. 33 Ultimately , does it matter if we invoke 
reactions and fermentations in order to cast light on the secret of our 
nature? Are humors, putresences, alkalis and acids inferior to the phen-
omena of simple propulsion? Probably not. From one point of view, 
this approach is actually more logical: the "animal spirits" were 
undoubtedly pure matter, for the theory specified their nature and 
located their origin in the process of distillation! Therefore, the 
human body having been turned into a chemist 's laboratory should 
not amaze us because we have already witnessed it having been turned 
into a carpenter's workshop. Here the phenomena of the animate 
served to explain the nature of life itself. But the soul became every-
thing while the body remained inconsequential. 
There was more to it than this, however . Nothing resembles modern 
vitalism less than does the animism of Stahl which formulated bodily 
activities exclusively in terms of the soul. 34 On the other hand, 
nothing resembles the cosmology of Descartes more. Apply all of this 
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to the microcosm of man and you will have the following: inert 
matter with a spiritual soul; a cadaver vivified by reason; death 
battling against life; and, decomposing matter in the presence of 
immaterial unity. Thus, Malebranche pushed his master's doctrine to its 
inevitable conclusion and denied any possible relationship between 
mind and matter.35 He admitted to no influence by the soul over the 
body except through the direct intervention of God. By contrast, 
Stahl supported the theory of secondary causes operating in each 
bodily action and - here is the difference - believed he could prove 
his point. But he did not explain how this reasoning soul directs so 
many hidden actions - that of the heart, for example, where the will 
can neither initiate nor impede. Stahl never satisfactorily came to grips 
with this. Along with many others, he supported the most unusual 
interpretations while, at the same time, he sacrificed the multiplicity 
of phenomena to the needs of an artificial unity. This being so, I 
strongly doubt that he would have found flattering the unrestrained 
eulogies directed toward him during the materialistic 18th century. In 
addition, Cabanis was to gratuitously attribute to him the fear of per-
secution by orthodoxy, the same Caban is who says that the soul is 
only a "catch all" word that is responsible for "digestion in the 
stomach, respiration in the lungs, filtration in the liver and biliary 
tract and mentation in the central nervous system." 36 
III 
The awareness of vital properties was introduced into the study of 
man by Albrecht von Haller, a man whose glorious reputation rests on 
this same magnificent advance. Furthermore, he linked this same idea 
with the even broader vision of seeing in matter something in addi-
tion to inert expansiveness. Actually, the idea of studying matter as 
force and quantity goes back to Leibnitz. 37 True, when he pro-
pounded the concept of force, he exaggerated an idea which should 
have complemented (rather than absorbed) the concept of quantity. 
And if recognizing a sort of virtual activity in matter was itself a 
radically sterile insight, still, it did provide seed for sowing the natural 
sciences which have sprung to life during these past two centuries. 
Indeed, this same effort spawned a whole line of thinkers who were 
concerned with the intrinsic energy of objects, objects which suddenly 
possessed futures. From Haller and Linnaeus to Buffon and Geoffroy 
Saint-Hilaire, this school developed in parallel with that of the pure 
Cartesians. 38 And ultimately, when the former assimilated the latter, 
new and infinite horizons opene~ for the life sciences. 
How was this great revolution accomplished? Through what phases 
did it pass en route to our own era? How was the study of vital prop-
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erties complemented by the study of organic forms such as genus and 
species? This remains for me to explain. But here we encounter M. 
Flourens who is no historiographer but who does at least provide my 
explorations with an interpreter if not a guide. I refer you to the 
second part of his book, "An Historical Glance at the Analytical 
Study of Life." 39 But what I really want to do is survey the general 
flow of ideas up to our own time. Then we shall inquire whether or 
not the latest formulations of M. Flourens are, in fact, tenable. 
The theory of vital properties, amounting to the analytical study of life, 
was born at Montpellier at the hands of Bordeu. From Montpellier the 
undertaking became transplanted in Gottingen where it was enriched by the 
experiments of Haller. From Gottingen it then came to Paris where it was 
further popularized by the writings of Bichat. 40 
M. Flourens thus begins his survey. Then he renders a verdict: 
This analytical study, which was popularized by Bichat, was then com-
pleted by my own experiments. 41 
M. Flourens is therefore dealing with the vital properties and, in 
effect, is opening up several new vistas. He is also mentioning new 
names in addition to the greats who had already "staked out" the ter-
ritory of experimental physiology. In turn, these newcomers are to 
become just as ingenious as those whom we already recognize. In 
addition, they are to acquire a more philosophically-oriented men-
tality and will establish connections with modern ideas. Buffon, 
Barthez and Gall - these are the ones who necessarily occupy the first 
rank here. 42. 43 
M. Flourens subordinates the chronological order of facts to the 
logical order of ideas. Thus he begins with Bordeu and demonstrates 
(using the very best example possible) how a simple and powerful 
idea, whether it falls within science or within one of the social stUdies, 
rides the crest of circumstance, achieves maturity and finally asserts 
itself.44 Bordeu was an audacious 20 years old when he dared to 
attack "head on" in his inaugural thesis, the two established systems 
- the animism of Stahl and the mechanicism of Boerhaave. 45 To the 
first he delivered several strokes of pressing logic and subtle irony. To 
the second he presented decisive experiments. The result was the 
appearance that day of the animal spirits while the animal mechanics 
were demoted to the second rank where they always belonged. 
Bordeu's first thesis would have fallen short had it been a solitary 
undertaking. But he wrote a second thesis which then was to bring 
him glory. For here, in recognizing sensitivity, he established for the 
first time a property without an analog, a property which did not 
resemble weight or heat or electricity or chemical reaction or anything 
present in inanimate objects in any way. But almost immediately , 
Bordeu went beyond the limits of his advance. He left " sensitivity" in 
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general and pursued the particular "sensitivities" of specific organs. 
Quickly, then, the word _ "sensitivity" began to lose that precision 
which originally had given it such force. Therefore, for Bordeu's pupil, 
Fouquet, "irritability" was to become only a lost branch of sensi-
tiuity.46 This linguistic artifice is then analogous to the manipulations 
of Condillac since it allows the role of analysis to include the task of 
synthesis."? Thus there were two men in Bordeu - the wise observer 
who existed with the student of Montpellier, and for whom unity had 
to emerge at any price. I myself would gladly consent to erecting the 
structure of "sensitivity" over the ruins of animism but only on the 
condition that this new edifice would stand supreme and to the exclu-
sion of all others. For as long as science will exist there will be minds 
inclined toward making analogies and unities, just as there will be 
those inclined toward pointing out discrepancies. Montpellier 
exemplifies the first tendency. In media uirtus. 48 
How much more judicious in its proceedings, more independent in 
its vision and more fertile in its results was the revolution of Haller 
which was occurring at the same time beyond the Rhine! Haller saga-
ciously analyzed all the organs and all the tissues with no preconceived 
ideas. This was a real departure from the approach of general 
anatomy. And he discovered one consistently reproducible reality in 
the midst of all transience. After carrying out hundreds of experi-
ments over a period of 17 years, he proclaimed this great law: muscle, 
and muscle alone (the gluten animal or, as we say, the organized 
fibril), possesses the property of contracting, of shrinking under the 
influence of a stimulus. And this property, which is distinct from 
elasticity (that purely physical property), is irritability which, since 
the time of Bichat, has been more reasonably designated as con-
tractility.49 Conversely, every organ that contracts is a muscle, and 
muscle is defined by contractility alone. M. P. Berard has remarked: 
You will app rec iate the impetus given to physiology by the c larification 
of irritability if only you will imagine the chaos which had to be unraveled 
at that time. Men like Baglivi were making a contractile organ of the dura 
maier! This quasi-heart was imagined to be what kept the vital (or animal) 
spirits in circulation by contracting and relaxing alternately. One believed in 
the shortening of tendons and in the oscillation of nerves which were 
responsible, in a mechanical way, for setting the muscl e fibers to going. One 
even believed in the contraction of the plexes that form the nerve networks 
around blood vesse ls. 50 
Haller then passed from muscle to nerve and recognized in nerve 
alone the faculty of feeling. This property would eventually include 
the capability of realizing precision and discrimination. Still remain-
ing, of course, was the_ task of establishing the mutual dependence 
between nerve and muscle, and here Haller was unable to gather 
enough conclusive evidence to convince the physiologists. Adjuc sub 
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judice lis est.51 But this question was of secondary importance since 
the two terms had already been established and their interconnected-
ness would not further define the unique nature of either. 52 Thus, 
when Haller established two of the fundamental properties of living 
organisms beyond all question, he rendered to science a service worth 
more than a thousand theories could provide. Indeed, in passing the 
test of time, this great doctrine has successfully resisted contradic-
tions, vicious exaggerations and misapplications: Cullen, Brown, 
Rasore, Broussais - each of them reintroduced it, and in turn and 
under various names and forms, into the study of disease according to 
the needs of his respective cause. But even though systems pass away, 
this doctrine endures with the indelible stamp of truth. 53-56 
After Haller's ideas moved quickly into France, even the Mont-
pellier School apparently considered compromising its beloved world 
view. Whatever, Barthez, with much more resolve (and no experi-
ments) attempted to make the principle of irritability the principle of 
life itself. This is how he reasoned: the physician seeks to integrate 
particular facts into more general facts. Finally, he attempts to arrive 
at facts that are beyond any framework. To these all-inclusive facts he 
gives the name laws. And, to the unknown forces by means of which 
these laws manifest themselves, he gives the name properties. The 
physiologist 's problem is exactly the same except that his facts, being 
infinitely more complex, demand an analysis that is infinitely more 
delicate. 
Now what exactly did Haller do? Precisely this and nothing more. 
And wasn 't Barthez seeking those same vital properties Haller had so 
clearly defined? Yes, he was, and had he not been so preoccupied with 
scholarship and doctrine - those ghosts of the tribe, as Bacon called 
them - he too could have found them. What happened, of course, was 
quite the contrary. Demonstrating nothing, he proclaimed the exis-
tence of a unique principle, which he named the vital principle, and 
then deemed all biological phenomena secondary manifestations. He 
did not feel obligated to define this entity or to determine what it was 
or where it resided. He ended by substituting a word for that which 
required an explanation. Don't ask whether this principle was inherent 
in organs or had an independence analogous to that of the soul. 
Barthez was pleased not to know. Actually he posed the question and 
added that it was unanswerable. The remainder of his work, likewise, 
should not be taken seriously for throughout its entirety he speaks as 
though he believes in the isolated existence of this same principle. It is 
this illusion that M. Flourens has exposed so very well: . 
We must s p ea k fr eely. Barthez constantly personifies his vilal principle as 
he himself acknowledges: "Throughout the course of this work , I p erso nify 
the vilal principle. " He admits that h e does so in an attempt to introduce it 
into conversation more conveniently. But why p erpetuate a langu age th e 
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reader will need to correct endlessly? Wouldn 't it be simpler and more con· 
venient to speak p recisely in the way that one wishes to be understood? 57 
Barthez's kind of language could bear fruit, of a sort, granted. It could 
give us a uniformly speculative physiology whose ultimate expression 
would be a text devoted to the function of organs which would never 
be named! It could also bring us indirectly back to something even 
more vague than the archaei of Van HelmonL To be sure, this imagin-
ary being, this veritable persona would have instincts, repulsions and 
preferences. But then, when some sort of lethal force would challenge 
the whole construction, the vital principle would then become indig-
nant, the channels of conciliation would become exhausted and a 
battle to the death would ensue. One of the adversaries would, of 
course, succumb. Every battlefield sees its crops destroyed and its 
houses ravaged, true. But here, the human body would provide the 
battlefield and its deformed habitus would attest, especially after its 
demise, to the terrible encounter that once raged there! Now M. 
Flourens too has become a legatee of Montpellier. He has come to 
possess a vision where a consensus of differing functions is brought 
together in unity and where humanity becomes (via cause and effect 
or principle and result) really organized, despite theories that make it 
conceptually unmanageable. 
Were this a lesson in physiology, I would now analyze the doctrine 
of Bichat but such an undertaking is obviously out of place here. Still, 
we should see where Bichat follows Haller. Albrecht von Haller distin-
guished contractility, the property of the living body, from elasticity , 
the property of the inanimate. It was this insight that Bichat seized 
upon and attempted to generalize. Thus, every organ (being material) 
possesses, according to him, the general properties of matter and the 
inherent properties of living things as well. There are, therefore, tissue 
properties (dependent on texture) and vital properties (related to 
function). He first posed this distinction in his Treatise on Membranes 
but later extended it throughout the corpus of his work, making it 
"the soul" of his general anatomy. But neither of these properties is 
manifested consistently and both often appear simultaneously, and in 
differing degrees. In other words, there are actions which man 
accomplishes as man and, in addition, actions which are accomplished 
within him. In the first instance, the will is active, while in the second 
it is passive. It was Buffon who saw and articulated all of this: in each 
animal there are functions which supervise its preservation, nutrition 
and propagation. There are others, within a more elevated order, 
which put the animal into relationships with the world beyond, 
through intermediaries - sensations, thoughts and willed acts. In short 
there is an interior and an exterior life, independent but subordinate. 
Let us now backtrack. M. Flourens has held Bichat's manuscripts in 
his very hands and has mastered Bichat's thought better than has 
anyone else. 58 Thus he is eminently suited for showing to us the birth 
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(to use his own word) of Bichat's doctrine and for distinguishing that 
which Bichat borrowed from that which he himself introduced. 
Actually, Bichat composed a whole body of doctrine after he had 
adopted a hypothesis which had been thrown out in passing. By the 
use of imagination and penetrating analysis he enumerated the 
anatomical and physiological characteristics which belong to each of 
the two lives, organic and animal. The vegetative possesses only the 
first group. The animal (considered abstractly) contains those of the 
vegetative life in addition to those of t he second life . He then studied 
the modifications and quantitative aspects of these same two lives 
after general anatomy had cast a completely new light on the vital 
properties. Finally , he put back together that which he had taken 
apart. The two lives were not absolutely isolated from one another. 
Reunited, they constituted the individual. How were they related? 
Experiments were needed to answer that question and Bichat per-
formed them with decisiveness and illumination. He established the 
mutual interdependence of the three great functions - the circulation, 
the respiration and the nervous action. As long as these actions were 
maintained, life existed. When one of them ceased to function, death 
supervened. The death of one of the three sufficed to still t he other 
two. The brain, the lungs and the heart - these constituted the tripod 
on which each life rests. 
Encircled by that ubiquitous triple halo - youth, genius and misfor-
tune - Bichat died at age 31. His theories were undoubtedly flawed 
with imperfections, it is true. Indeed, M. Flourens has demonstrated 
convincingly how a brilliant style could be substituted for fact by one 
with an ingenious mind and a lively imagination. To be sure, every-
thing does hang together in the natural order. All the same, his impor-
tant distinction does hold up, although the separation of these two 
lives is less complete than the theoretician himself would have wished. 
Yes, his distinction has profoundly influenced the general character of 
science ever since and has become the point of departure in contem-
porary physiology. 
It seems to me that Bichat was the spiritual father of a great family 
that can be divided into two branches, the physiologists of organic life 
and those of animal life. As fruits of the former, general anatomy and 
its offspring, microscopic anatomy, have opened up perspectives here-
tofore unsuspected. The studies of generation and of nutrition (which 
is ongoing generation) have reflected an anatomy with a fresh new 
countenance. Workers within the fields of embryology, organogeny 
and histology are no longer content in considering tissues and organs 
that are completely formed. Instead, they have focused on the very 
process of formation. They have moved from considering "that which 
is" to "that which is becoming." But isn't this the definition of life 
itself, "becoming without ceasing to be?" I would think so. Finally, 
this entire ensemble has been rounded out by the astonishing progress 
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within the field of organic chemistry. We can see how Lavoisier gave 
birth within this same field when he enunciated the great phenomenon 
of gas exchange in the lungs. 59 Also, we can see how M. Dumas gener-
alized the data of vegetal and animal in the formula "vegetals are 
apparati of reduction, animals are apparati of combustion. "60 And 
finally we can see how M. Bernard, who wished to sanction this doc-
trine through experimentation, paradoxically discredited it by discov-
ering sugar formation in the liver.61 This one discovery gave science 
such a radically new turn that it is now impossible for us to predict 
what will happen next. As for the second group, the "physiologists of 
animal life," they have given in our own time an enormous impetus to 
the study of the nervous system. Who has not heard of Charles Bell or 
Magendie? 62 Who has not heard of Gall, whose beautiful anatomical 
discoveries will one day redeem his absurd phrenological system? And, 
finally, who has not heard of M. Flourens? I will return to this shortly. 
IV 
We have just covered a fertile period during which great progress 
was also made by those who worked within the natural sciences, and 
heretofore, we have considered man almost exclusively. Now let us 
study an enlarged ensemble of being, beginning with the least elevated 
and least complex representative of this ensemble, the plant. Among 
the life sciences, the field that is most expansive and varied, the most 
simple and most congenial to a logical approach is botany. It is here 
that inductive reasoning leads directly to fact, and too, here that 
theory finds expression in practice. Consider, for example, the organs 
within any random specimen. The transitions are so well integrated, 
and the analogies so apparent, that one idea easily leads to another, 
and then to another. It is here that truth is never encountered in isola-
tion. 
Let us also consider the species. The intimate but obvious relation-
ships so common to so many species alert us to the possibility that a 
common type of relationship exists here. Our minds, sensing that they 
are on the right path, strain ahead. Yet what we really need is a genius 
to illuminate the richness of this situation. Once again, M. Flourens 
emerges. In the second volume of his Eulogies he projects this exhil-
arating spectacle as he brings to life again the personalities of Bernard 
and Laurent Jussieu, Desfontaines, Labillardiere, de Candolle, Dupetit-
Thouars and Benjamin Delessert. 63 - 68 Thank God we no longer live 
in that era when it was fashionable to compare the classifications of 
Linneas with those of Jussieu in order to advance the supposed 
superiority of the Frenchman. Now a more enlightened criticism 
recognizes the more natural approach of Linneas. And even though he 
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recognized only a small number of plants, he nonetheless had the good 
sense to prepare the definitive categories of "genus" and "species." 
Subsequently, these categories became the keys to his whole natural 
method. Thus, he was the unequivocal and indispensable precursor of 
Jussieu. Then, having established this link, M. Flourens analyzes this 
same natural method - just as he analyzed the doctrines of Bichat. 
Further, by focusing on the origin of this link, he also allows us to 
appreciate the milieu of Bernard de Jussieu, the first great name of 
that dynasty. Actually, Bernard did nothing but compile a catalogue 
of the Trianon gardens and write a few letters. Yet M. Flourens has 
traced the history of his hero's ideas by drawing on these same few 
letters and on family documents which he collected with a great deal 
of trouble. We thereby learn about Bernard's intimate association with 
his . nephew, Laurent (whose accomplishments would one day surpass 
those of his uncle), and about the step-by-step advances of this great 
joint enterprise. 
In retrospect, we can see that 1789 was a great year for botany. The 
publication of Laurent Jussieu's Genera Plantarum itself marks the 
beginning of a genuine revolution. Indeed, before this event took 
place, characteristics had been counted. From then on, however, they 
would be considered. At the same time, Jussieu bequeathed to us that 
great principle of the subordination of characteristics. Henceforth, 
common sense would perpetuate what genius alone could initiate. 
What can we say about this great scientific revolution that has not 
already been said a hundred times? Probably nothing. Still, let us fol-
low the flow of ideas. First, Jussieu showed that the structure of the 
embryo would reflect the form, size functions - in short, the life of 
the plant that was to emerge. This same reality was seen from a differ-
ent angle by the great German poet, Goethe, whose vision inspires us 
even to this day. 69 This marvelous genius impressed his seal of orig-
inality and invention on everything he touched, in science as well as in 
literature. He was the first to grasp the analogy that exists between the 
reproductive organs of animals and those of plants. He extended this 
analogy from cotyledon to ovula. But this analogy is not merely con-
ceptual. Its validity can be convincingly demonstrated by utilizing cul-
tures. One can transform a leaf into a branch, a branch into a calyx, a 
calyx into a corolla and a corolla into a stamen. Any difference 
between these organs is a difference of degree only. And the flower, 
the carpel, is no more than the final stage in a long series of miscar-
riages. But this "failure" reflects the striking phenomenon of a con-
centrated, intense and vital activity that actually becomes reproduc-
tive. The sexual organ is diminutive in terms of form but multiple in 
terms of power. 
Let us move on to subsequent developments. Pyrame de Condolle 
designated a somewhat broader concept as "degenerescence." He 
beheld separated forms in young plants which then moved toward a 
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greater unity in the adult flower. Thus he was able, through morpho-
logic study, to conceive of a vast and beautiful botanic destiny: all 
plants gravitate toward a symmetrical prototype. But this idealized 
form is never actualized. Not only are there "monstrosities" within 
each species (unique culturing yields correspondingly unique mon-
strosities), but in addition there are entire species which are them-
selves monstrosities. Or, stated in another way, all species tend by 
degree toward a normal prototype which the mind is compelled to 
envision. Again, it is culturing that allows us to develop the missing 
structures and to generate the forms which are empirically abnormal 
but conceptually more perfect. The pe[ory, for example, is an 
acquired monstrosity.70 Yes, nature presents forms which awaken in 
us the idea of geometrical counterparts even though she never presents 
a perfect circle, a perfect triangle or a perfectly straight line. Thus the 
botanist leads us to the abstract but definitive idea of anticipating a 
whole series of higher forms. Here I mean organic forms which only 
indirectly become apparent. 
Now this general outline has been abstracted from M. Flourens's 
own book. What we cannot abstract though, is this author's originality 
and gracefulness. His civilized tone projects a science that has popular 
appeal but no vulgarity. Indeed, few things are more difficult than 
achieving balance in the histories of intellectuals since one here must 
integrate lives with works. Indeed, when this is attempted, the thinker 
tends, all too often, to disappear behind the conceptualizations that 
dominated his existence. Nonetheless, this balance is exactly what M. 
Flourens creates. He leaves ideas in the foreground but explains them 
by utilizing considerations of the writer's character. Each eulogy is a 
portrait where ideas and personal habits are etched with exquisite 
proportion. Each living portrait is an ongoing kaleidoscopic drama. 
For example, the milieu of the Jussieus is captured with exceptional 
freshness and charm. This calm household is seen admitting outside 
influences which then blend harmoniously with the gentle rhythms of 
domestic life. How skillfully M. Flourens contrasts this oasis with the 
turbulent world beyond, with its social turmoil, its annoying rumors 
and its revolutionary passions! How touching is the fraternal (I almost 
said "patriarchal") celibacy of Antoine and Bernard - the one pro-
viding revenue and the other providing prestige for the household! 
Yes, and after Antoine's death, we can see how he was replaced by a 
nephew who likewise commands our affection and admiration! First a 
student, and then a nurse, this fine youth helps the practically blind 
old man across his dear flower beds and asks in return, only for the 
elder's reflections on literature. The uncle, of course, is no less admir-
able. He recognizes the growing genius of his nephew and puts the 
riches of his own genius at his disposal. He voluntarily instructs the 22 
year old professor who, days before, was his student and who, days 
later, will be the intellectual master of all Europe. 
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The other portraits of Flourens feature the same pleasing tones and 
subtle nuances. We can appreciate the naive savageness of Labillardiere 
and the inexhaustible activity of B. Delessert, that Mycenian of 
science, that patron of every worthwhile project. 71 This colorful 
knight of the botanical world possessed personality as well as heroic 
ideas. And finally, in addition to beneficial information, this book 
provides examples of the world's two most important qualities-
genius and virtue, united within individual personalities. 
v 
I am tempted to analyze zoology in some detail, too, but this might 
exhaust you, who are my readers. Actually, M. Flourens has already 
done this in his readily available Historical Eulogies. Furthermore, the 
writings of Cuvier have so captured attention that we need only to 
consider the aftermath. Precisely what did Cuvier propose when he 
created comparative anatomy? Just this: he made it possible to assign 
to organisms places within the realm of being by virtue of their struc-
tural characteristics. Thus we learn that the characteristics of both 
plants and animals possess unequal value. Like money issued in two 
different metals, one group of characteristics serves as a fixed standard 
while the other fluctuates with circumstances. And here again, the 
hierarchy of characteristics provided a thrust for methodology. A key 
characteristic was seen as shedding light on an infinity of other charac-
teristics. Thus, from a tooth and a bony fragment, it became possible 
to reconstruct an entire animal and to deduce with fair certainty its 
diet, its instincts, and its contours. At the same time, the great theory 
of lost species emerged from this foundation, and even geology, 
through the use of restored fossils, became magnificently crowned by 
comparative anatomy. But despite the majestic unity of this particular 
method, method itself remained merely method. 
So let us now look at conclusions. How was the great question of 
the unity and continuity of the animal kingdon resolved? Once again 
Cuvier won out, this time with a glorious victory over Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire. Indeed, the notable debate between these men (before the 
Academy of Sciences) was so recent that recounting it is 
unnecessary.72 So let us look elsewhere and consider nature as a great 
living ladder, rising by imperceptible transitions (natura non tacit 
saltus) from the simplest plant to man, the dominator of creation and 
the intermediary who fuses matter and spirit.73 Well, this idea is the 
most brilliant poetical error the system-oriented mind ever spawned. 
Among moderns Leibnitz originated this same vision which brought 
such glory to Charles Bonnet and such eloquent defense from M. de 
Blainville.74-75 But I shall concede that this creation did render 
immense services to science since it did encourage elaborate investiga-
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tion and patient research. Also, it effectively re-established an infinity 
of transitional forms which, doubtless, would otherwise have gone 
unrecognized. And finally, it was valid - but valid only when applied 
to animals of one particular group. When extended to the entire realm 
of created being, it was simply not valid at all. 
Now let us here consider Jussieu once again. It was he who showed 
three parallel patterns of botanical organization based on multiple, 
solitary or absent embryonic cotyledons. These basic configurations 
were then related to a multitude of other characteristics such as organ-
ization of the stem and preponderance of either five- or three-flowered 
verticils, etc. Now Cuvier, whose methods so closely resembled those 
of Jussieu, also matched him in compiling results. He showed the 
necessity of recognizing at least four major categories of zoological 
organization. 76 Then, within each of these groups, he showed how 
secondary types emerged, types which might vary profoundly 
although not essentially. These types could not be superimposed 
because they were seen to be of different orders. But although the 
first was more developed than the second, the most perfect representa-
tive of the lower order went far beyond the least perfect member of 
the higher order. Well, this puts us on the path of a still more expan-
sive idea regarding the fecundity of nature. 
Now let me explain how the word "perfection" is used by those 
conversant in natural history. The lowest form of life involves indis-
tinct functions and properties as well as simple organization. Take, for 
example, the amoeba. It seems to be nothing but a drop of mucus, 
with neither nerve, nor muscle, nor blood, nor lung, nor heart. But 
each section of the organism is endowed with all of its properties, even 
though each of them is rUdimentary. Then as we ascend the develop-
mental scale, we find that functions (and organs) begin to be differen-
tiated. The physiological enterprise becomes more and more divided 
while vital activity becomes more and more concentrated within 
special apparati. These apparati, in turn, seem to acquire energy quite 
in proportion to their degree of specialization while the subordination 
of apparati proceeds according to the same laws of proportion. When 
each part then becomes self-sufficient, it can then be isolated with 
impunity.77 The obligations stemming from a collective existence 
therefore render hierarchy ever more necessary and integrity ever 
more indispensable. One should therefore not expect to find in 
animals an absolute perfection. The word " perfection," when under-
stood in this sense and when applied to matter generally, loses its 
usual connotation. This is what I want to clarify. 
Let us move on. Now the most false of all natural philosophies 
holds that in order to encounter perfection in nature, it is necessary to 
find perfect creatures. Beware of this view. It leads to a demand for 
nature's inner secret - the reason why the all-perfect God has pro-
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duced a universe which, of necessity, cannot be perfect. Instead, isn't 
it more consoling and intellectually satisfying to view nature as an 
immense and harmonious unity in which everything is perfected by 
being properly located? When it is considered in this way, the universe 
no longer comes into focus as a sort of ladder but becomes, instead, a 
vast, rich and unalterably beautiful empire where nature playfully 
entertains itself by producing every form imaginable. Thus, nature is 
limited only by organic incompatibilities and absurdities, as Cuvier 
points out. 78 But nature does, in fact, adapt existence to every con-
ceivable environment. Mollusks can live outside water while mammals 
can become aquatic. And yet, neither random mating nor the caprices 
of civilization are ever really able to break through the limits which 
separate those forms which are actually related - even dependent-
but which are, organizationally speaking, profoundly dissimilar. 
If this much is clear, then we need not emphasize morphology any 
longer. No more must we behold, through the eyes of a crude 
nominalism , the life sciences as being mere "games of nature." 
Through absolute ignorance were we told about the "essence" of 
creatures and about "forms" which were the manifestations of divine 
thought. This kind of revelation involves an ideal that is, supposedly, 
more real than reality itself. Indeed, it is certainly possible to become 
lost in a dream world of abstraction where there is neither motive nor 
demonstrable hypothesis. But by the same token, do we ever, in this 
world, do anything but search for ideals? Indeed not. And if someone 
objected to ideals as eternally unfulfilled, as mere idle imagining, I 
would object to them and ask: is justice itself merely a myth-
knowing as we do, that the justice of the Stoics, say, never actually 
came into existence? Let us never abuse our theorizing but let us, at 
the same time, never cease looking for the truth. We need not cry out 
with the Greek philosopher, "7TaIlTet PEEl ."79 Visions which 
obliterate contours and reveal only rubble can indeed make us skep-
tical and afraid. But there is always available a more noble vision 
which can reassure and enlighten us. No, the currents of moving mat-
ter are not random and, yes, everything does pass on. But everything 
moves directionally within the harmonious totality of existence. Like 
a divine breath, life circulates throughout the universe. It does not 
exist in the confused and random manner which antiquity misper-
ceived: "Mens agitat molem et magno se corpora miscet. " 80 Life does 
not precipitate into bodies, disperse itself, and then become annihil-
ated. By contrast, bodies embrace it in order to become idealized - if 
that can be said. No longer do we grasp for an image of life within a 
vague and fleeting vision. Science has given a body and a countenance 
to life itself. Life, so invariably fixed and so infinitely varied - life is 
spread in every direction and dispersed amidst millions of discernible 
forms, each endowed in every manifestation by the force of infinite 
reproducibility. And even more exhilarating, this untold diversity is 
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arranged in perfect harmony! Closely related molecules come together 
to form tissues which come together, in turn, to form organic struc-
tures. Then these same apparati, which are living matter, become 
almost analogous to the force of gravity as it relates to the centers of 
inert bodies. No, our eyes behold neither species nor genus, class nor 
kingdom. But our intellects do behold these realities which are no 
less concrete and substantial than those we see and touch. Each par-
ticle of matter comes and petitions for its place at the great banquet 
of living individuality. Once matter becomes resituated, new proper-
ties emerge and move in new directions. Yet the fundamental forces of 
nature are in no way annihilated in the process. Within this inexhaus-
tible torrent of life, each individual particle of matter acquires (in 
proportion to its degree of assimilation) a summum of vitality which 
cannot be surpassed. And then , once it is beyond this zenith, matter 
becomes dissimilated, moves out among more diffuse currents of vital-
ity, and comes to serve some other existence which will lay claim to it. 
At times, the mixing of species does appear to create new forms which 
deviate from the prototype in order to prevail under altered circum-
stances. But this detached tributary either runs dry or ultimately 
returns to the great channel from which it originated. Thus, the sum 
total of living matter remains nearly constant though in a perpetual 
movement governed by Providence. Oh, an individual, a species, an 
entire genus, or an enigmatic transitional form can succumb, as the 
debris layered in terrestrial deposits testifies. But then a new genus 
appears, as if to bring variety to this dynamic spectacle of creation 
where everything remains but where everything is renewed. 
VI 
Now let us confine our attention to Monsieur Flourens. Perhaps our 
circuitous route has reached its destination after all. Has M. Flourens 
been faithful to what the title On Life and Intelligence implies? 
Frankly, I think not. If I am not mistaken, such a title suggests that 
some problem has been solved. However, when no solution emerges, 
his book, like so many others, becomes no less than perfidious. True, 
he does provide a partial solution, but this kind of sin is even more dif-
ficult to pardon. 
Now M. Flourens has written eloquently on the history of the life 
sciences and has offered eulogies of naturalists and doctors in the style 
of Fontenelle. He has also given a highly regarded course at the Col-
lege of France on 19th century natural sciences. What I am trying to 
say is that M. Flourens knows better, and expresses better, everything 
that I have thus far tried to present. But suddenly the naturalist and 
anatomist disappears and we are left with a physiologist who is only 
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concerned with experiments. He tells us that "for a century our entire 
physiology has been a mere repetition of the physiology of Haller. 
Consequently, it is time to formulate new - or, at least, clearer-
ideas about what it is that separates life from intelligence." And fur-
ther on, he informs us that he is "delivering a mass of new and original 
material to provide that which has been lacking - perspectives for the 
physiologist and facts for the philosophers. " This is what he says and 
his tone has already brought him criticism. As I have mentioned, his 
book is dogmatic but I think that this merely reflects the confidence 
that is born of conviction. I do reject his conclusion, opposed as it is 
to all of his previous conclusions, but I accept the rest of his offering 
and wish only to find proof of its validity. 
The substance of his first section, en titled "On Life ," is this. Some 
forces contribute to the exercise of life by governing matter while 
others do the same thing by maintaining form. "The great secret of 
life lies in the permanence of forces amidst matter which is contin-
ually mutating." As a matter of fact, this does define one biological 
phenomenon, nutrition. But there is another side to the question and 
in the second section, entitled "On Intelligence," he provides a new 
analysis of the vital properties. Personally, I would have preferred his 
placing everything concerning life in the section on life but I will 
gladly waive condemnation. So let us modify his aphorism and accept 
it. But is this vision really novel? I think not. As I have maintained, 
studies in comparative anatomy long ago established the constancy of 
form in both species and in individuals. The remainder of M. Flouren's 
hypothesis is therefore a mere commentary on Cuvier's famous 
passage: 
Th e direction of pe rpetually turbulent life, complicated as it is, remains 
constant as does the kind of mol ecules involved . But the individual mole· 
cules themselves, the ac tual matte ,· of the living body, these do not remain 
constant and, by contrast, cease to ex ist. And yet, the deposito ry of force 
will constrain emerging matter to move in the same general direction. Thus, 
bodily form is more essenti al than bodily matte r since the lat ter changes 
endlessly while the former remains constant. 81 
This profound passage is indeed remarkable. Indeed, it is this that 
Cuvier maintained at the outset and this that his entire work merely 
develops. But M. Flourens wanted experiments so he borrowed those 
of Spallanzani on the reproduction of salamander feet.82-83 I beg 
your pardon, but these particular experiments seem distinctly 
inappropriate. The changes resulting from amputating a member are 
less relevant than those which occur within a healthy member where 
form endures but where elements change unceasingly. We may need 
proof of the renewal of matter but we do not need proof of the per-
sistence of form. This is a self-evident reality. Seeing bones, ligaments, 
muscles and nerves faithfully reproduced is an extraordinary exper-
ience, true enough. Indeed, the really extraordinary phenomenon is 
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reproduction itself. Yes, the reappearance of one lone epidermal cell 
in a higher animal therefore merits the extended reflection of physiol-
ogists. But we need not be so extreme. Is there any greater marvel than 
the fertilized egg consistently reproducing the characteristics of its 
species? I, for one, need no other experiments. But what did Spallan-
zani prove? He showed that the ability to reproduce mutilated parts is 
inversely proportional to the height of the animal in the develop-
mental scheme. That is to say, it is proportional to its centralization of 
apparati. In a dog, this ability is virtually nil. Each isolated piece of a 
water polyp, however, can reproduce an entire organism. This 
phenomenon, of course, should not be overlooked. But the experi-
ments of M. Flourens would make this repair faculty one of the essen-
tial characteristics of life, whereas it actually decreases as one ascends 
the developmental scale. And we could also say a lot about the very 
curious phenomena of aberrant plasticity. One part of an organ can 
become elongated, hypertrophied or deformed without any discern-
ible cause! Thus, there are many cases where life is maintained while 
both living matter and form change incessantly, too. 
Let us therefore look at the central issue. How do we prove the con-
tinuous renewal of matter? Perhaps by the madder-root and related 
experiments which are published in his study, The Experimental 
Theory of Bone Formation. 84 Now these are decisive experiments 
indeed. We note that a suitable diet can impart to bone a distinctive 
color. Then, after we have used a platinum blade, we can observe in 
the bony sections a ring which appears first on the outside but which 
moves, with the passage of time, inward. Thus, without ceasing to live, 
the bone loses on the outside what it gains on the inside. Yes, all of 
this is clear, certain and conclusive. But M. Flourens exaggerates the 
substantial impact already made by these experiments. Haven 't we 
possessed for a long time irrefutable proof of what his latest experi-
ments merely confirm? I think so and cite such obvious examples as 
the ingestion and assimilation of food, the exchange of gas in the 
lungs, and the expulsion of azotized end-products of combusted mat-
ter via the kidneys. Aren't these experiments proof enough that 
molecules pass continually through the entire organism? I think so. 
Granted, the experiments of M. Flourens have demonstrated that in 
bone this passage takes place in a constant and determined direction. 
And, along these same lines, I could go even further and state that his 
experiments suggest that the same probably applies to all the other 
organs. But has he the right to conclude so quickly that all matter in 
every organ grows and disintegrates, appears and disappears, through-
out the entire organism? No, indeed. 
Now if some antagonist were to propose that neither glands 
(secreting the digestive juices) nor the nervous system (presiding over 
movements of the nutritive process) could be subjected to the move-
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ments which they themselves direct, well I would then favor the 
hypothesis of M. Flourens instead. But has the alternative hypothesis 
yet been proven absurd by experimental physiologists who themselves 
fail to take into account the data of natural history? I think not. 
I am not deceiving myself as to the character of my current role. I 
am bringing forward many objections but no alternatives. Still, I have 
no choice. May I not express at the same time both admiration and 
skepticism about remarkably precise experiments 'Which have none-
theless eventuated in the formulation of shaky conclusions? I would 
hope so. And isn't knowing how to doubt an integral part of science? 
Indeed it is. Nonetheless, this role is painful and I ask a little 
indulgence. 
VII 
M. Flourens moves on smoothly to a study of the nervous system. 
Let us follow him over this new terrain. I have mentioned how he con-
siders life and intelligence and how he tries to separate them . I must 
mention, too, that he has had access to ample resources for studying 
the nervous system, a fact which perhaps attests to the inadequacy of 
each of them in isolation. Let us take note of these. First, he has had 
access to gross anatomy. But here the normal landmarks are difficult 
to discern since the organs are so soft and delicate. Also, it is difficult 
to preserve the modifications which were impressed prior to death in 
these delicate post-mortem specimens. Second, he has had access to 
comparative anatomy, a rich area which reflects the parallel develop-
ment of function and structure and which allows us to further delin-
eate function by highlighting structure. But this discipline involves the 
great difficulties of establishing analagous parts (in fish, for example) 
and of being unable to distinguish decisively the lower (more poorly 
differentiated) creature from the higher (more well differentiated) 
species. Third, he has had access to human pathology which 
approaches the functional lesion from the perspective of organic 
alteration and which allows us to learn the character of normal func-
tion through studying the manifestations of deranged function. How-
ever, extremely complex lesions have all too often meant that this 
science has frequently provided contradictory findings. Still, it does 
allow for a certitude that is out of proportion to the paucity of its 
established facts. Finally, he has had access to experimental animal 
physiology. M. Flourens has stated that this setting permits the study 
of disease carried out under controlled conditions. Consequently, he 
has adopted this means of exploration to the exclusion of all others. 
But this should not go unchallenged. For despite the services they 
unquestionably render, the vivisectionists are not without their liabil-
ities. They place the experimental animal in a milieu that is com-
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pletely artificial while they substitute abrupt interventions in the place 
of the slow, inexorable progressions of authentic diseases. Moreover, 
they necessarily mutilate the exposed organs and profoundly alter the 
animal's life which then must irrevocably end. And yet we must 
express our gratitude to M. Flourens for having standardized the pro-
tocol in the operator's manual. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the 
authentic physiological existence of an animal is never simulated when 
its skull or vertebral discs have been removed to expose its brain. 
The final conclusions of M. Flourens emerge with admirable unity 
even when the inevitable shortcomings of methodology are taken into 
account. He recognizes five principal properties of the nervous system 
- sensitivity, motoricity, coordination of locomotive movements, 
intelligence and the life principle - and supports his conception of the 
properties with a series of summarized experiments as he attempts to 
locate each of them in a specific organ.R5 Now it would be impossible 
to discuss these experiments individually so I won't try. And, by the 
same token, it would be foolish to challenge M. Flourens's consum-
mate ability to vivisect. Therefore, I shall accept his findings, overall, 
and shall speak of the data as he first set it forth.86 Hopefully, the fol-
lowing is a succinct and accurate resume. 
First, sensitivity resides in the posterior columns (faisceaux) of the 
spinal cord, in the posterior roots of the nerves and in the entirety of 
nerves derived from this root (racine). Second motoricity - the 
property of directly provoking muscular contraction - resides in the 
anterior columns of the cord, in the anterior roots of the nerves, and, to 
some degree, in the entirety of nerves deriving from this root. These 
two conclusions reflect the fine work of Charles Bell and of Magendie 
and have been overwhelmingly accepted by the scientific world. 87 
Third, the principle which coordinates the locomotive movements that 
spring from the anterior columns of the cord resides in the cerebellum. 
Now prior to M. Flourens, no one ever suggested this fact which today 
is accepted by the majority of physiologists as well as by me. (I would 
also here reject totally Gall's view that the cerebellum presides over 
physical love and of Magendie's view that it presides over forward 
propulsion.) Fourth, a double function is carried out by the medulla 
oblongata. This structure, the bulb, establishes communication 
between the spinal cord, on the one hand, and the brain and cerebel-
lum on the other. It links volition, as well as coordination, with the 
immediate production of movement. Also, by virtue of a small quan-
tity of grey matter situated in its posterior aspect, it serves as both the 
motor and regulatory principle of respiratory movement. Through this 
structure, the medulla exercises a direct influence over respiration, over 
circulation and, consequently, over all life. This one point was hinted 
at by Lorry and Legallois and has virtually no spatial extension. 88. 89 
M. Flourens has defined its existence with far greater precision and 
has designated it much more precisely as the "vital knot. " Finally, 
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intelligence, the principle which presides over the perceptions and 
volitions and, properly speaking, over all psychic life, resides in the 
brain. 90 
M. Flourens then draws his first interpretive conclusion. The 
properties of the nervous system are mutually exclusive. The organ 
which houses one does not house the others. Yet at the same time, 
there is subordination. The brain presides over everything which is or 
which depends upon intelligence while the " vital knot" presides over 
everything that is life. 
Now let us examine this postulation. Can we really localize in an 
absolute and exclusive manner, even in the light of these experiments, 
the properties of the nervous system? No, we cannot. I have said that 
the anterior columns of the cord are the seat of movement and that 
the posterior columns are the seat of sensitivity. But what about the 
brain? Can we concur that the brain is profoundly and absolutely 
insensitive? Well, in the normal state this is undoubtedly true. Anyone 
who has craniotomized a living animal knows that one can trim, pick 
and lacerate the brain without having the animal display the least sign 
of sensitivity. But subject the brain to the slightest inflammation and 
note the dramatic sensitivity that ensues. Any excitation, any jolt 
provokes atrocious pain. I am even more amazed that M. Flourens did 
not make this distinction because he very clearly established, in the 
volume I am quoting from, that fibrous tissues, such as ligaments, ten-
dons and aponeuroses are perfectly insensitive in the healthy state but 
extremely sensitive when inflamed. This same is probably true of the 
brain. 91 We can therefore see that the brain is not " profoundly and 
absolutely insensitive." 
And is movement completely alien to the brain? No, not com-
pletely. M. Flourens alleges that the spinal cord, which contains the 
pripciple of movement, contains it completely. It is there and nowhere 
else. The brain contains only the intellect and the will. But the will 
here is seen as the occasional cause of the movement principle. The 
logical extension of this would therefore be that a brain lesion should 
abolish the will and a cord lesion should abolish movement. Studies in 
pathology show us, however, that the second proposition alone is true. 
As a rule, a lesion in the cerebral hemisphere affects neither the intel-
lect nor the will. Instead, it abolishes or diminishes movement in the 
opposite side of the body. ~ 2 To explain the persistence of intellect 
and will, M. Flourens will doubtless propose an experiment which 
pretends to establish the unity of the intellect by considering it in 
terms of the unity of the brain. We will examine this shortly. But a 
sufficiently plausible explanation is this : When the connections 
between the seat of volition and the seat of movement are interrupted, 
the influence of the one on the' other becomes impossible. Yet even 
this explanation, apparently so plausible when a lesion sits at the root 
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of the hemispheres (next to the bulb), is not plausible at all in the 
numerous cases where a complete paralysis results from a very super-
ficial lesion. The paralytic always wants to move but, time and again, 
he does not move! Thus, the organ of movement here is healthy and 
the organ of the intellect is diseased , a situation that runs contrary to 
the theory of M. Flourens. We must therefore conclude that the brain , 
too, is motor in nature. 
To repeat this first point, then, the brain is neither absolutely insen-
sitive nor is it absolutely removed from movement. We could advance 
other evidence to support this position but this seems to be sufficient. 
Also, this same argument can serve to establish that the principle of 
coordination of voluntary movements which resides in the cerebellum, 
is exclusive neither of a certain sensitivity nor of a certain motoricity. 
VIII 
I consider M. Flourens to be more fortunate in situating the intel-
lect exclusively within the brain. Indeed, it does appear to reside there 
in its entirety. In a series of remarkably clear and well controlled 
experiments, he has demonstrated that when a light stimulus impresses 
upon the retina, sensation moves through the four medullary tubercles 
and perception occurs in the brain. Consequently, there are three 
ways of rendering an animal blind - by eliminating visual stimuli or 
sensation or perception. Perception (the idea) is therefore seen to be 
more than just sensation that has been transformed. When this fact 
became established, then the scaffolding of Locke and Condillac was 
sent tumbling.93 M. Flourens went one step further, however, and 
added that the unity of the intellect could be understood only in 
terms of the intact organ. Successively remove several slices of brain 
and observe that all the mental faculties persist. But excise the brain 
entirely and observe the disappearance of them alL Suppress one 
faculty and all are lost. Revive one and all return. Thus, they all some-
how hold together. The organ is one and the intellect is one. 
I do admit that few theories are more appealing than this one. It 
appears to support strongly that most congenial philosophical dictum, 
the unity of the self But let us look at the facts. First, these experi-
ments were all conducted on chickens and pigeons, a regrettable situa-
tion, since these animals can hardly qualify as models of intelligence. 
Relatively speaking, they are lower animals whose unique functionings 
are not applicable to those species that are higher on the develop-
mental scale. Second, we can cite many factors that flatly contradict 
the apparent validity of this theory. From his theory one can infer 
that a large brain component is usel~s if removing it brings about no 
apparent consequence. But this argument is drawn from the considera-
tion of final causes and I would like to dispose of it by citing the vast 
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testimony of comparative anatomy. Here, despite several exceptions, 
most of the evidence demonstrates that intellectual development is 
related to brain development! Par.e.on the crudeness of this image, but 
this parallel suggests that where there is more cerebral substance, there 
is more space for the development of mental faculties. Third, we see 
innumerable patients who possess very restricted lesions but who lose 
the entire intellect. Fourth, we must consider the innumerable idiots 
whose brains present no perceptible alteration. In the light of M. 
Flourens's theory they should have the same capacity as everyone else. 
Fifth, and finally, we must recognize the numerous cases where a 
limited lesion involves a partial loss of intellect (such as the memory) 
or, even more curiously, a partial memory loss (such as substantives, 
places, etc.). 94 This is all very well established and therefore detracts 
from the validity of M. Flourens's theory no little bit. 
Within this context, then, what can we say about anatomical integ-
rity? Well, seeking to establish philosophical truth with this kind of 
evidence is dangerous, I can tell you! If one employs the studies of 
organs in order to substantiate supportive arguments, one must also, in 
justice, study the implied arguments there that are, at the same time, 
detractive. But no matter, because the dictum of the unity of the self 
doesn 't really need this kind of support. As I see it, a unique principle 
with multiple manifestations - such as the intellect - can, with regard 
to these manifestations, flow from the organ 's anatomical variation. 
Therefore, I ask M. Flourens to allow me this judgment. Even though 
he recognizes the unity of the intellect with unexcelled vision, he 
projects a conception that is too materialistic. Rather than allowing us 
to conceive of it, he makes us imagine it. In concluding that unity pre-
supposes indivisibility, he seeks to establish indivisibility in terms of 
the physical integrity of an organ! 
Even though I am concerned here mainly with physiology - the 
physiology of M. Flourens - I shall nonetheless touch briefly on a 
psychological error that really is rather crucial. In the tradition of 
Malenbranch, M. Flourens falls into the perennial error of confusing 
the intellect and the will. Between the acts of judging and deciding-
or, as the psychologists say, between the operation of understanding 
and the nisus of will - there is an abyss. I act after my intellect 
accepts a motive, true. But my approval of an act does not necessarily 
eventuate in my executing the act. This holds true in the material 
order and even more so in the moral order. Is seeing the best path to J 
follow the same as following it? Indeed not. If it were , then intelli-
gence would be a virtue and a bachelor's degree would suffice for 
sainthood! Also, since I wish to avoid indiscretions, I will not ask M. 
Flourens what he makes of affectations, of sentiments. These are not 
sensations and do not, I presu~e reside in the posterior columns of 
the spinal cord. Where then do they reside? In the brain? 
180 Linacre Quarterly 
{ 
IX 
We now come to the vital knot. I call this "knot" the knot of M. 
Flourens's entire system for when we encounter it, we must truly 
struggle to untangle the important concept of intelligence from that of 
life. 
Now we have seen that every willed movement reflects three 
elements: the will (primary cause) whose principle resides in the brain, 
the motor impulse (immediate cause) whose principle resides in the 
anterior columns of the spinal cord, and coordination whose principle 
resides in the cerebellum. And yet, some movements are governed 
only temporarily by the will while others occur in spite of it. For an 
example, I can cite respiratory movements. 9 5 Here the crucial 
elements are motor impulse and coordination. These properties flow 
from a very restricted focus in the medulla oblongata, one which has 
no linear extension. Below this point, the spinal cord can be cut away, 
slice by slice, and even though its function is profoundly altered, respir-
ation persists. In addition, the entire encephalon above this point can 
be cut away and respiration persists. Other evidence also supports this 
fact. However, leave the entire cerebrospinal axis intact but cut this 
solitary point and death follows immediately. 
Now M. Flourens was the first to grasp this important fact which, 
were it his only discovery, would justify all the accolades he has 
received. But he then goes beyond this observation and adds, " .. this 
point is the center of all vital action. This is the 'vital knot. ' " Thus, he 
creates a new property of the nervous system, life itself. In his scheme 
of things life becomes a property, like sensitivity and motoricity. This 
new property is focused in a specific organ, the "vital knot. " Life is 
here and nowhere else. But let us return to our previous considerations 
of the mind since they should be helpful in discerning vital properties 
in the present context. What we must find is a primitive event that is 
inexplicable and irreducible. Have we arrived at this situation here? At 
this crucial focus are the principles of movement and coordination of 
an entirely differen t order than those which operate throughout the 
remainder of the nervous system? No, indeed. But before we go on we 
should perhaps inquire about whether we are speaking of different 
things. Are movements of the muscles of locomotion and those of res-
piration really different? Perhaps. We have already noted one apparent 
difference - the cord governs movement only under the influence of 
the will. Yet when this stimulus is removed, the "vital knot" governs 
movement. But is this difference really as clear-cut as we would like? 
The whole problem is rather delicate. The spinal cord is not only an 
organ of transmission but is also a focus of movement. Under appro-
priate circumstances, activity does become evident. Thus, following its 
separation from the encephalon, the cord apparently becomes excited. 
Also, irritating a skin segment in this same situation is followed by 
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muscular contraction although it is not necessarily those muscles that 
correspond to the stimulated skin segment. Evidently this is a non-
willed movement following a non-perceived sensation. Marshall Hall 
has studied this phenomenon carefully and has designated it reflex 
action. 96 The spinal cord 's property of giving birth to it has been 
designated excito-motor. This property resides in the grey matter of 
the spinal cord. (Let me also mention that subsequent studies have dis-
closed that reflex actions playa very prominent and heretofore unsus-
pected role in maintaining the harmony of bodily action.) Conse-
quently, physiologists today are unanimous in classifying respiratory 
movements among the reflex actions. Air acts on the mucous mem-
brane of the airway and provides the stimulus necessary for producing 
movement. This is also how we explain the first inhalation of the 
newborn (who previously had laid apneic in his mother's womb) as 
well as continuous respirations during sleep when the will no longer 
concurs. Yes, each of these phenomena proceed in the following 
order: mucosal irritation, then non-perceived sensation, then non-
willed motor impulse, then muscular contraction. Contraction (being 
essentially intermittent like the muscular activity of external life) soon 
ceases and exhalation, a purely passive phenomenon, then occurs. 
Everything then begins once again and always proceeds in the same 
order. 
But all of this can occur after the encephalon has been removed. It 
takes place just as well (if not better) as previously because excito-
motor power increases following the separaton of the cord from the 
brain. Of course stimuli can still be transmitted because of the 
integrity of the pneumogastric nerve. 97 But why is the portion of the 
cord below the "vital knot" incapable of taking the knot's place? Per-
haps because it does not receive any sensory nerves from the respira-
tory mucosa. Whatever, I merely want to draw attention to the rela-
tionship that exists between the "vital knot" and excito-motor power. 
M. Flourens augments this analogy by contending that the latter flows 
from the grey matter. 
Next, we encounter the problem of trying to understand why the 
movements of respiration are not brisk, jerky or irregular like those 
which follow the stimulation of other reflexes. M. Flourens acknowl-
edges the presence of a faculty in the medulla which not only pro-
duces but also coordinates movements. Actually, I see nothing special 
or specific in this. Certainly I see no new property. 
Now we return to our main problem. If a lesion of the cord or brain 
does not produce death by paralyzing the muscles of locomotion, it 
fails because these muscles are not directly involved in maintaining 
life. By contrast, a lesion of the "vital knot" produces instant death 
because it paralyzes those muscles whose action is immediately neces-
sary for maintaining life. We must grasp this important distinction. To 
say that the medulla is the seat of a principle whose capital function is 
182 Linacre Quarterly 
essential for life is to say the truth. But to say that the medulla con-
tains the principle of life itself is to assert something profoundly dif-
ferent. The validity of the first by no means implies the validity of the 
second. If it did, we could just as easily say that the principle of life 
resides in the heart. In fact, when we cut off the blood supply to the 
"vital knot" - and this operation is relatively simple to perform - its 
activity ceases and death rapidly supervenes. We could then conclude, 
with apparent reasonableness, that life resides in the circulation 
because circulation is indispensable for animating those organs which 
are themselves indispensable for maintaining life! Who then shall 
decide between Hunter, who located life within the bloodstream, and 
M. Flourens, who locates it within the "vital knot"? Actually, both 
opinions are valid provided they don't become mutually exclusive. We 
can even lend support to the first view by quoting M. Flourens 's state-
ment that totally suppressing the cerebrospinal axis fails to immedi-
ately suppress the circulation! 98 But all of this is extraneous. The 
functions which participate in maintaining life are circular and it 
matters little where you interrupt the circle as long as you interrupt it. 
But M. Flourens is not content to put life itself in the medulla. No, 
he also refuses to situate it in any other structure. At first I thought 
that this was just a matter of semantics. However, I am no longer able 
to question the intent of such a phrase as this: 
I say intelligence as distinct from life because intelligence resides in an organ 
where life does not reside and , reciprocally, life resides in an organ where 
intelligence does not. 99 
Then, further along, he states: 
Intellige nce, then, is where life is not. And where life is found, intelligence is 
absent. The organ of the one is not the organ of the other. 100 
What? The brain separated from the spinal bulb no longer lives? It 
lives so well that it does nothing but live! I shall grant that it probably 
no longer presides over thought. But the cord, the nerves and the 
muscles - they all live! Stimulate the cord and movement results! 
Stimulate a muscle and it contracts! Indeed, the more one reflects 
upon the ramifications of life, the less one is able to separate it from 
death by the limits imposed by established systems. 
Surely M. Flourens must see it this way because he says: 
I distinguish the action of a unit from the fullness of that action. Each unit 
draws neither its absolute life nor its absolute action from the medulla s ince 
each part can be separated from the cord and yet live (or some time. Even 
during this final interva l it can be stimulated. It is only by degree that each 
living and acting part fulfills its function. 101 
There is here a timidity of language that should escape no one. The 
fact remains that every organ preserves a certain vitality even after it 
has been separated from the "vital knot." Thus, the "vital knot" is not 
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the organ of life, it is the center of the mechanism of life among 
higher animals. 
An objection now arises: lower animals get along quite well with no 
"vital knot," indeed, with no nervous system at all. Well, M. Flourens 
seems to have anticipated this and replies that in these animals the 
vital properties are mixed. But this is precisely the question. The fresh 
water polyp lives without a "vital knot," the leech has one "vital 
knot" in each of its component rings, while man has one "vital knot" 
and only one. 102 Here we can see three levels of life manifested in 
three remarkable forms. Can we say that one lives more than the 
others? In any absolute sense? No, we cannot. They all live. But the 
last is infinitely more perfect than the second, which is, in turn, more 
perfect than the first. Thus, M. Flourens has mistaken an accessory 
characteristic - the centralization of function, which relates to the 
degree of perfection - for an essential characteristic. 
x 
I would like to conclude with a summary. M. Flourens confronts 
two problems. The first involves defining neurological properties and 
localizing them within specific structures. The second involves distin-
guishing between life and intelligence. Complementing Charles Bell, he 
has separated sensitivity from motoricity.103 Furthermore, he has 
located the former in the posterior columns of the spinal cord and the 
latter in its anterior columns. He has also clearly distinguished the fol-
lowing: the immediate cause of muscle contraction (motoricity) from 
the stimulating cause (the will) which resides in the brain; the produc-
tion of movement from the coordination of movement, this being a 
function of the cerebellum; and sensation (an exclusively vital phen-
omenon) from perception (a purely psychic one). Furthermore, he 
concludes that he has separated intelligence from sensitivity (and 
motoricity) by identifying, experimentally, the specific organs within 
which each of them resides. I think that I have shown that this distinc-
tion is only partially valid because the entire brain embraces, in some 
way, each of these three important functions. Finally, he sets out to 
establish the definitive limits of intelligence, and of life itself, and 
attempts to do this by appropriating these phenomena to respective 
organs. I have tried to show that here he has failed completely despite 
a brilliant effort. At best, he has succeeded in refining the important 
but very general concept of life that has come down to us from Bichat 
and Cuvier. Science will not benefit very greatly from this, however. 
But is this to say that he has rendered no significant service, even in 
this particular area? God forbid it! He has clearly established the 
intimate interplay between the components of the nervous system as 
well as the prodigious proportions of this system, a reality which 
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should never detract from the unsurpassable importance of each com-
ponent. In addition, he has underlined t he mutual interdependence of 
the nervous, respiratory and circulatory systems. I am being neither 
condescending nor polite, only sincere, in saying that all of this is 
most admirable. Moreover, I encountered here his wisdom and stead-
fastness in his treatment of every important philosophical question. I 
really cannot exaggerate my praise, for it is here, where the ideas of the 
intellectual dim, that the character of the m an himself becomes 
apparent. Indeed, only an exceptional thinker would make this state-
ment after arriving at an apparent certainty : 
Here is phys iological proof of th e inte ll ect's essential unity. Undoubtedly, 
the phi losophica l proof is even stronger. But we must address each sch ool in 
its own language and show th ose who use physiology in supporting faulty 
philosophies that such support does no t ex ist. On th e other hand, to employ 
phys iology is not to deny the realm of intuition. 104 
Such a statement is worth more than a discovery because it reflects 
a mind that is capable of making o ne that is really important. 
Finally, we should mention one more delicate question, the one 
regarding the intelligence that has been accorded animals. Surrounding 
this great desidera tum of the philosophy of Descartes, we find the 
same loft y ideas, the same wise appreciation. 10 5 Here M. Flourens is 
able to speak of man from the point of view of a naturalist and of 
animals from that of a true philosopher. In striving for magnanimity, 
man does not need to belittle the animals. Of course, we see that 
reason and reflection constitute a chasm (between the animals and 
man) t hat can never be bridged. "Animals feel , think and perceive. But 
man alone has the power to feel that he feels, to perceive that he per-
ceives and to think that he thinks. " 106 And this is why less has been 
given to man by way of instinct and why he has, in the realm of intel-
ligence, such a capacity to acquire. Antiquity wisely held that the 
Divinity was most pleased by the great spectacle of man in the throes 
of misfortune. Well, I agree with them. The uncoerced development of 
moral force has about it a greatness that is beyond all comparison. But 
beyond this there is an even greater and more consoling vision . Man 
arrives in this world morally and physically feeble and unarmed , 
limited in instinct but indefinitely perfectible. Both as a species and as 
an individual, he is obliged to a battle incessantly against the dissolu-
tion of his organs, the misery that is conveyed by his senses and the 
inadequacy of his faculties. But then he bo lsters his atretic mentality 
by developing ideals and will power, and he sets out to conquer t hat 
immortal empire of ideas, assaulting it head-on in a struggle that has 
no end but the grave. Yes, it is this very spectacle that M. Flourens so 
simply and so clearly shows to us, in the precise language of science 
and with the spare eloquence of fact. 
I end with a t estimonial, the best that I can offer. If M. Flourens 
has creat ed no important method, he has at least renewed one. I refer 
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to the use of not only observation but also experimentation in the 
doing of philosophy. Beginning with Descartes, all of the 17th century 
philosophers were physiologists. By contrast, all philosophers in the 
18th century exaggerated the separation of the body and the soul-
these which should be unified. But no, they applied analysis every-
where. Similarly, this present century, which has given birth to Kant 
on the one hand and to Bichat on the other, has yet to see the 
intuition of the philosopher united with the sagacity of the experi-
menter. I will not criticize this now, nor will I speculate on the future 
- on whether it will ever let us glimpse the inner reality of that secret 
bond uniting life and intelligence which is the profound mystery of 
our nature. But I do know that the example of M. Flourens proves to 
me that if ever a genius does truly grasp the meaning of "intelligence 
served by the organs," that man will be a physiologist-philosopher. 107 
May M. Flourens be that man! 
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Does it not resu lt instead from ramifications of large sympathetic nerves accom-
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of th e arteria l and venous systems, h e was neve r honored with a major hospital 
appointment. 
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these ne rves does not kill the an imal imm ediate ly . I consider this a grea t presump-
tion. But in pursuing a definitive a nswer, wou ld it not be bette r to s imul taneously 
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